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Development of unconventional oil and natural gas in the U.S., particularly the 
exploitation of shale gas, has been highly controversial with significant geopolitical 
implications. It is unquestionable that this so-called “golden era” of natural gas has brought 
not only significant new technologies and economic growth but has also raised important 
environmental concerns, including air pollution from methane emissions.  
Methane (CH4) emissions from the oil and natural gas industry have been of critical 
and increasing concern for public policy. New evidence (Zeebe, et al. 2016) has confirmed 
record high levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) in 66 million years, with CH4 emissions 
considered a significant risk for global warming and climate change.  For this reason, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued in 2016 a new “methane rule” to 
control emissions from the oil and gas industry by obligating the use of specific abatement 
measures to reduce pollution. This study analyzes the application of an optimization model 
to represent a market-based strategy of a cap and trade system as an alternative approach 
 vii
to regulating emissions. This option is more efficient than traditional command and control 
regulations at achieving the same levels of methane reduction in the oil and gas sector, and 
this hypothesis is verified by applying the optimization model to a sample of oil and gas 
production facilities operating in the Permian Basin. In spite of all the political-scientific 
efforts and discussions, we are still far from the knowledge needed to achieve a public 
policy strategy that balances sustainability with economic development, and I hope this 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of unconventional natural gas has played a significant role in the 
U.S. economy, and it is considered one of the potential solutions for the nation to become 
independent of hydrocarbon imports. The natural gas consumption in the U.S. continues to 
show increasing trends while prices have been declining. Because of this so-called, "golden 
era" of natural gas, reserve estimation of this resource is a critical factor for defining future 
energy policies with significant economic and geopolitical implications. Horizontal drilling 
with hydraulic fracturing has triggered this "shale gas revolution" and it is considered one 
of the most important technologies in the development of energy markets in recent history. 
Shale gas in the United States has grown in less than a decade to represent about 50% of 
U.S. domestic production, and the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has become 
a highly promising economic opportunity during this shale gas revolution. 
Environmental issues associated with U.S natural gas exploration and production, 
especially in unconventional shale plays, have significantly affected operator performance 
and technology development. Several lawsuits have been filed claiming that gas drilling 
contaminated residential water supplies and environment in general. Hydraulic fracturing 
of shale wells, popularly known as “fracking”, requires a substantial amount of water per 
well, and in some areas because of severe drought, like Texas, shortages are a growing 
concern. Because of environmental apprehensions, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
issued a report in 2009 stating that the oil and gas industry would have to spend over ten 
billion dollars to comply with the environmental requirements set at that time.  
Environmental risks associated with developing natural gas with hydraulic 
fracturing and horizontal drilling are evaluated in four major areas: 
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Water: Construction of wells, injections, use of freshwater, and wastewater 
disposal create risks of freshwater depletion, and contamination of groundwater, surface 
water, and drinking water.  
Community: Increased earthquake events in some regions, such as Oklahoma and 
Texas have been a particular concern for the communities.  Also, oil and gas operations 
have been associated with more traffic and increasing visual and noise pollution. 
Land: The rapid expansion of drilling operations and well sites can temporarily 
damage landscapes, and affect the ecosystem in particularly sensitive regions.  
Air: Onsite operations create potential emissions of volatile organic chemicals 
(VOCs), and greenhouse gasses (GHG) such as methane (CH4), nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
and other air pollutants.  
Figure 1. Environmental impacts of unconventional oil and natural gas resources. 
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Air pollution, and particularly, methane emissions from the oil and gas industry, 
has turned into a huge concern for policy makers, especially nowadays with carbon release 
rates from anthropogenic sources reaching a record high, and being unprecedented during 
the past 66 million years (Zeebe, et al. 2016).  
In an effort to control air pollution, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
took a prescriptive command and control approach and in May 2016 issued what is called 
“the methane rule” which specifies the type of pollution-control devices to be installed by 
the industry to reduce emission levels.  
Alternatively, market-based strategies, such as cap and trade systems, have proven 
to be a more efficient option than traditional regulation to control environmental problems, 
and they have been successfully adopted for pollution control in the United States for more 
than three decades (Schmalensee, et al. 2015). In 2009, a cap and trade plan (also known 
as Waxman-Markey plan) was the main policy proposed to address climate change, but 
this strategy failed to be included in the climate policy in the U.S. Senate in 2010 because 
the emphasis in public policy switched to health care as a national priority.  
 
OBJECTIVES AND CHAPTER DESCRIPTION 
The main purpose of this study was to develop and apply an optimization model to 
evaluate the performance of a firm participating in a cap and trade system in the oil and 
gas industry. Our hypothesis is that a market-based strategy should be a more efficient 
alternative than regulation for achieving same methane emissions reduction. The model 
was applied to the top facilities producing and generating methane emissions in the 
Permian Basin. The sample includes about 22 thousand wells producing since 1958 from 
about 37 thousand leases in Texas and New Mexico. The model estimates the minimum 
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total cost of reducing a specific amount of emissions by either purchasing tradable permits 
in the market and by using abatement measures or self-purification strategies for years 
2016 to 2020.  
Chapter two discusses the relevancy of methane emissions in the oil and gas 
industry and analyzes both the contingency of pollution-control measures that have been 
proposed and implemented by the Government (EPA’s “methane rule”) and the basics of 
a cap and trade system.  
Chapter three describes the model that was implemented, the area of study where it 
was applied and all the relevant variables and sample data that were used in this research.  
Chapter four describes the parameters used for application of the model, the 
forecast of emissions for the period 2016-2020 based on gas production projected, and 
presents the results obtained for various scenarios with the corresponding sensitivity 
analysis. 
Chapter five discusses the main implications for policy analysis and relevant 




Chapter 2: Background 
Shale gas is mostly methane (CH4), extracted from rocks formed by the 
accumulation of sediments (sedimentary rocks) more than 300 million years ago. Shales 
formed by deposition of fine particles of silt and clay at the bottom of ancient seas, 
compression of these sediments under the weight of water, and other cementation of these 
sediments and other particles together. In this process of compression, organic matter 
(mostly marine microorganisms) were integrated into the forming rock, locked in the tight, 
low-permeability layers, exposed to increasing amounts of heat and pressure within the 
Earth’s crust, and ultimately transformed into oil and gas. Because of the very low 
permeability and porosity of shales, mechanical stimulation – hydraulic fracturing – is 
required to extract hydrocarbons from the rock.  
Hydraulic fracturing, popularly known as "fracking," is a technique that has been 
applied since the 1950's but only became popular at the end of the 1990’s with the 
development of unconventional (shale) natural gas. Hydraulic fracturing is a technique in 
which the rock is fractured by a liquid injected at very high pressure, creating cracks in the 
rock formations through which natural gas and oil can freely flow. After the hydraulic 
pressure is reduced in the well, small grains of hydraulic fracturing proppants, such as sand 
and other aluminum oxides, maintaining open fractures once the rock achieves geologic 
equilibrium.  
The use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling in developing 
unconventional reservoirs has impacted air pollution near extraction sites mostly by 
increasing methane emissions. CH4 is a greenhouse gas that is more powerful and effective 
at trapping heat in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide (CO2). They are, however, much 
shorter lived than carbon dioxide.  Methane is one of the most important GHGs after H2O 
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vapor and CO2 with a Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 25. In other words, methane is 
25 times as potent as CO2 on a 100-year timescale, and therefore CH4 emissions can have 
a substantial impact on climate change threatening health and welfare of current and future 
generations.  The oil and natural gas industry is the largest industrial source of methane in 
the world. Methane emissions have been a major concern for the U.S. Government and in 
May 2016, after five years of working on several regulations, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) finally issued the “methane rule” to reduce methane emissions 
from the oil and gas industry. Nevertheless, this issue is far from a final solution, and it 
will continue to be actively debated, we certainly will witness a very vigorous discussion 
on the efficiency of this regulation strategy to control emissions compared to alternative 
market strategies.  
Figure 2: U.S. Methane Emissions by Source. EPA 2013, WMO. 
7 
 
According to the Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990-
2013 EPA Report, the natural gas and petroleum systems are the largest industrial emitters 
of CH4, accounting for about 30% of U.S. emissions.  
Howarth et al. 2014 stated that CH4 emissions from unconventional natural gas 
(shale gas) are significantly higher than emissions generated in the production of 
conventional reservoirs, concluding that the climate impact of shale gas may be greater 
than that of conventional fossil fuels. The authors also stated that methane emissions 
reported by EPA at drilling sites are drastically underestimated. Howarth’s study has been 
considered controversial and highly disputed. K. Brown’s article in “Energy in Depth”, 
April 2014, for example, stated that the authors of the Howarth study are “well-known 
activists promoting the banning of hydraulic fracturing”. Brown also indicates that in 
Howarth’s study, researchers specifically targeted high emission areas, did not use direct 
measurements, considered small sampling, and, contrary to their findings, as natural gas 
production has gone up, we have observed that methane emissions have fallen 
dramatically.  
In September 2013, The University of Texas at Austin released what has been 
considered one of the most comprehensive studies on methane to date (Allen, et al. 2013). 
This study took direct measurements of CH4 from 190 natural gas production sites during 
completion operations for hydraulically fractured wells. One of the major findings of this 
study is that total annual methane emissions from all sources are “comparable” to EPA’s 
estimates.  
A more recent study (Zimmerle, et al. 2015) shows that the majority of methane 
emissions in oil and gas operations is most likely derived from flaring of gas and other 




From the discussion above, we can clearly observe that methane pollution 
associated with developing unconventional reservoirs has been and will continue to be 
highly debated, and certainly we will witness a dynamic discussion on this matter. 
 
EPA “METHANE RULE.” 
For the last 5 years, EPA has been working on a comprehensive regulation 
(“Methane Rule”), as part of the President’s Climate Strategy and the Clean Air Act to cut 
methane emissions from the oil and gas industry, and finally, in May 2016, the agency 
released the first set of standards and started the process to control emissions. This new 
rule was published on June 3 in the Federal Register and involves mostly the use and 
replacement of specific technologies for the four main segments of the natural gas industry: 
Production, Processing, Transmission and Storage, and Distribution. Figure 3 highlights 
the relative amount of methane emissions associated with each segment. According to the 
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report: 1990-2013, methane emissions from natural gas 
systems totaled 157 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (mmtCO2e) in 2013, 
representing a 2% increase from emissions in 2012.  Categorized by stage, methane 
emissions from the production stage totaled 47 mmtCO2e, while emissions attributed to 
the distribution stage totaled 33 mmtCO2e in 2013. Emissions increased 38% from gas 
processing between 2005 and 2013, from 16 to 23 mmtCO2e, respectively, and emissions 
from transmission and storage increased 11% between 2005 (49 mmtCO2e) and 2013 (54 
mmtCO2e). Between 2012 and 2013, emissions from distribution increased 8%, from 31 
to 33 mmtCO2e. 
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Figure 3: U.S. Methane Emissions Rates Associated to Each Stage. 
According to EPA, methane emissions from the field production are primarily 
associated with pneumatic controllers and the hydraulic fracturing, completions and 
workovers of gas wells. Processing plants account for 14% of methane emissions and 58% 
of non-combustion carbon dioxide emissions from natural gas systems. Methane from 
processing increased as emissions from compressors increased because the quantity of gas 
produced also increased. EPA stated that compressors and dehydrators were the primary 
sources of methane emissions in the transportation and storage stage, accounting for 35% 
of total emissions from natural gas systems. Nevertheless, emissions decreased by 7% 
between 1990 and 2013 because of voluntary reductions (particularly the replacement of 
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high bleed pneumatics devices with low bleed pneumatics). In the distribution stage, EPA 
indicated that the increased use of plastic piping had reduced both methane and CO2 
emissions.  
EPA reported that energy-related activities were the primary sources of 
anthropogenic GHG emissions in the U.S., representing about 85% of total GHG emissions 
on a CO2 equivalent basis in 2013. That figure included 97% of the nation's carbon dioxide 
emissions, 41% of methane emissions and 12% of nitrous oxide emissions.  
The new EPA methane rule includes a comprehensive set of requirements that are 
amendments to the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for the oil and gas source 
category and prescribe new standards for both methane emission and volatile organic 
compounds (VOC) for specific equipment, processes, and activities as indicated below.  
 
Rule Specifics 
The principal amendments to the NSPS for the oil and natural gas source included 
in the EPA methane rule are the following: 
Compressors. The Agency is proposing a 95% reduction of methane from wet seal 
centrifugal compressors across the source category by requiring that operators of these 
compressors to replace the rod packing with a process through a closed vent system under 
negative pressure. Reciprocating compressors prevent methane leakage by encasing each 
compressor rod with a set of oil-coated, flexible rings. Proper maintenance and routine 
replacement of these rings prevent unnecessary leakage of methane. 
Pneumatic Controllers. The Agency is proposing a natural gas bleed rate limit of 6 
standard cubic feet per hour, which will reduce methane emissions from continuous bleed, 
natural gas-driven pneumatic controllers. For the particular case of processing plants, EPA 
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regulates methane emissions by requiring that natural gas operated pneumatic controllers 
have a zero natural gas bleed rate, as in the current NSPS. 
Pneumatic Pumps. The standards for pneumatic pumps apply to particular types of 
pneumatic pumps across the entire source category. At locations other than processing 
plants, EPA is proposing that the methane emissions from natural gas-driven chemical or 
methanol pumps and diaphragm pumps be reduced by 95% if a control device is already 
on site. For the case of processing plants, the proposed standards require the methane 
emissions from natural gas-driven chemical or methanol pumps and diaphragm pumps to 
be zero. 
Hydraulically Fractured Oil Well Completions. For subcategory one wells – non-
wildcat, non-delineation wells – the Agency is proposing that for hydraulically fractured 
oil well completions, operators use reduced emissions completions, also known as 
‘‘RECs’’ or ‘‘green completions,’’ to reduce methane emissions and maximize natural gas 
recovery from well completions. RECs are not required for hydraulically fractured gas well 
completions. For subcategory two wells – wildcat and delineation wells – EPA is proposing 
that for hydraulically fractured oil well completions, operators must use a completion 
combustion device to reduce methane. The proposed standards for hydraulically fractured 
oil well completions are the same as requirements for hydraulically fractured gas well 
completions in the 2012 NSPS and as amended in 2014. 
Fugitive emissions from well sites and compressor stations. EPA is proposing the 
use of fugitive emission surveys for new and modified well sites and compressor stations 
(including transmission and storage, and the gathering and boosting segments) 
Semiannually optical gas imaging (OGI) technology surveys for well sites and compressor 
stations are being recommended. Fugitive emissions can occur at the startup of a newly 
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constructed facility, as a result of improper connections and installation issues, or during 
operation. Under the new rule, the required survey frequency will decrease from semi-
annually to annually for sites with emissions lower than 1%, while the frequency would 
increase from semi-annually to quarterly for sites with fugitive emissions from three 
percent or more of their emission during a survey. EPA will continue to encourage 
voluntary efforts to attain emission reductions through “responsible, transparent and 
verifiable” actions.  
Other reconsideration issues being addressed. The Agency is proposing to address 
several other issues, such as storage vessel control device monitoring and testing 
provisions, record keeping for repair logs for control devices, flare design and operation 
standards, leak detection and repair for open-ended valves or lines, and disposal of carbon 
from control devices.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS STRATEGIES: CARBON TAX VS CAP AND TRADE 
As an alternative to the traditional command and control regulation, such as the 
EPA methane rule already in place, Environmental Economics Theory offers two other 
approaches to regulating air pollution problems more efficiently. These approaches include 
a carbon tax and a cap and trade system which are analyzed in the next section. The primary 
goal of this research is to propose, develop, and apply an optimization model to represent 
this market-based option of a cap and trade system. 
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Let us consider a basic situation with a single polluting company.  Under this 
scenario, the company with an increasing marginal pollution abatement cost curve (red 
curve shown in Figure 5) will select to abate zero units of emissions in the absence of 
regulation, and will avoid the abatement costs given by the area below the marginal cost 
curve (B + C + D in the graph). Under a cost-benefit analysis, there is an optimal abatement 
amount, where the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves intersect. The resulting 
equilibrium level of emissions is X* (measured right to left in the horizontal axis).  
Figure 4. Cap and Trade versus Emission Tax. 
Carbon Tax Policy 
One possible alternative to achieve this level of abatement X* is by imposing a tax 
where marginal benefit equals marginal abatement cost, as shown in the graph by the 
horizontal tax blue line. For this polluting firm, it is less expensive to abate emissions as 
long as the marginal cost is lower than the tax. Because the tax cost (A+B) is greater than 
the marginal abatement cost (B) to the left of the cap line, the firm will choose to abate. To 
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the right of the cap line the marginal abatement cost (C+D) is larger than the tax cost (C); 
therefore, the firm will choose to pay the tax and continue to pollute. In this case, the 
optimum abatement level of X* is achieved with a cost to the firm equals to B+C and 
government revenue of C. 
Emission Cap 
Another way to achieve the same level of abatement is to set a cap, where marginal 
benefit equals marginal abatement cost represented by the vertical cap line. The firm must 
abate to X* and, as a result, the optimum emission level is achieved with abatement cost 
to the pollution firm equals to B, which is lower than the previous strategy. 
Cap and Trade Approach 
To illustrate the cap and trade approach, let us extend the previous application to 
two polluting facilities with real data. Facility EP Energy and Facility Cimarex Energy Co. 
are two onshore petroleum and gas production facilities producing from the Permian Basin 
in Texas. Based on actual reports obtained from EPA sources, Facility EP generated a total 
of about 120,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (TCO2e) of CH4 emission 
during 2014. About 70% of emissions from this facility is caused by field production 
operation of 17 wells venting associated gas and 45 wells flaring associated gas. 
Facility Cimarex generated a total of about 130,000 (TCO2e) of CH4 emission 
during 2014. About 81% of the emissions is from natural gas pneumatic (high-bleed and 
intermittent bleed) devices.  
Let us also consider that the regulator limits emissions of methane to 200,000 
(TCO2e) in this region, setting this level as a cap and gives each facility two permits for 
100,000 (TCO2e) each. Facility EP will require investing $3,000 per 10,000 TCO2e 
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reductions (by replacing gas-assisted glycol pumps with electric pumps for example), and 
facility Cimarex needs to spend $1,000 for the same reduction rate (by increasing 
compression capacity to reduce venting and flaring).   In the absence of a market-based 
alternative, the cost of reducing emissions and complying with the limit of 200,000 
(TCO2e) will be $9,000; this is $6,000 for facility EP (reduction of 20,000 TCO2e) plus 
$3,000 for facility Cimarex (reduction of 30,000 TCO2e). Under the possibility of trading, 
we can observe that if facility Cimarex were to reduce 50,000 mtCO2e and company EP 
does not reduce its emissions at all, the cost would only be $5,000 for the same volume of 
reduction. By selling a permit to company EP for $5,000, Cimarex will recover expenses 
for the emissions reduction it would have to make to comply with the regulation, and the 
cost of the extra reduction made to trade with the other company. By buying a permit from 
Cimarex, EP saves $1,000 compared to making its reductions. As a consequence,  the total 
cost of a decrease in a cap without any trade would be $9,000, whereas, under a cap and 
trade system, the total cost of compliance for both companies involved has been reduced 
to $5,000.            
Based on this example, we observe that both the trade and nontrade scenarios 
generate the same reduction of emissions, but the first scenario is achieved at a lower short 
term cost for both facilities, this fact can also be demonstrated for the entire region. Given 
that the market-based strategy is more efficient than regulation, it is reasonable to question 
why the command and control approach is preferred to other alternatives. One of the 
possible answers is because environmental activists consider the market-based alternative 
creates a commodity out of pollution, frequently judged as a socially undesirable policy. 
Besides, cap and trade systems are considered vulnerable to manipulation by the political 




From the analysis above we can see that in the presence of negative externalities 
such as methane emissions, both a tax and a cap and trade will reach the same level of 
efficiency by obtaining the optimal reduction level at the minimum cost. The main 
difference is on distributional implications, and the cost to the firm is lower for cap and 
trade. The government receives revenue with the carbon tax strategy, and both policies are 
preferred over a command and control regulation. Polluting firms have an incentive to 
adopt new technology to reduce their marginal abatement costs with both a carbon tax and 
carbon tax and trade. 
Carbon taxes and auctioned emission permits generate revenue for the government 
that can be applied to reduce a budget deficit or decrease distortionary taxes on labor and 
capital. 
Market-based strategies, and particularly the cap and trade system, have been 
successfully implemented for several decades in the U.S. to control air pollution and next 
section summarizes the main lessons learned from previous experiences.  
 
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES OF A CAP AND TRADE SYSTEM: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In September 2015, China announced the world’s largest cap and trade program to 
reduce GHG emissions, the program will be launched in 2017 and will create a market for 
industries producing most of the CO2 emissions. This program definitely will impact future 
development of market-based strategies to control emissions, but it is not the first. 
Schmalensee et al., 2015, present an excellent overview of previous relevant experiences 
using cap and trade programs, being the following the most significant ones.    
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Trading emissions rights under the Clean Air Act – Acid Rain Program  
Originally this program was intended to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen 
oxides (NOx) emissions from 1980 levels (Burtraw et al., 1998). A market of SO2 
allowance trading emerged with cost savings of about $1 billion annually, compared with 
the expenses under command-and-control regulatory alternatives (Carlson et al., 2000). 
The program had a significant environmental impact, decreasing SO2 emissions 
significantly from the power sector from 1990 to 2005 (EPA, 2005).                          
 
The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) plan 
Approved by the South Coast Air Quality Management District in October 1993, 
this plan set an emissions cap and a declining balance for most of the largest facilities 
emitting nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides (SOx) in the South Coast Air Basin. RECLAIM 
included over 350 participants in its NOx market and about 40 participants in its SOx 
market. RECLAIM had the longest history and practical experience of any locally designed 
and implemented air emissions cap and trade program. RECLAIM allowed participating 
facilities to trade air pollution to meet clean air goals. The program aimed to provide the 
industry with flexibility to reduce emissions and generate advanced pollution control 
technologies. Allocations were issued to facilities based on their historic levels and 
appropriate emission control levels specified in the Air Quality Management Plan. 
Facilities have the option of complying with allowance by either reducing emissions or 




NOx Budget Program 
In 1999, under EPA guidance, 12 north-eastern states and the District of Columbia 
implemented a regional NOx cap and trade system to reduce compliance costs associated 
with the Ozone Transport Commission regulations stated in the 1990 Amendments to the 
Clean Air Act. Emissions limits for two zones from 1999 to 2003 were 35 and 45 percent 
of 1990 emissions, respectively. Compliance cost savings of 40–47 percent were estimated 
for the period 1999–2003, compared to a base case of continued command-and-control 
regulation without trading or banking (Farrell et al., 1999).     
 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative  
Nine northeastern U.S. states participated in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), the first cap and trade system in the United States to address CO2 
emissions. RGGI is a downstream program limited to the power sector. The program began 
in 2009 limiting ten emissions from regulated sources to current levels in the period from 
2009 to 2014. The cap was then set to decrease by 2.5% each year from 2015 until it 
reached 10% below 2009 emissions in 2019. It was originally expected that meeting this 
goal would require a reduction approximately of 35% below business-as-usual emissions 
(13% below 1990 emissions levels). The program's auctions generated more than $1 billion 
in revenues for the participating states. Some of this revenue has gone to financing 





California’s AB-32 Cap and Trade System 
California enacted Assembly Bill 32 (AB-32) in 2006, which required the 
California Air Resources Board to establish a program to reduce the state's GHG emissions 
to their 1990 level by the year 2020. The program included energy efficiency standards for 
vehicles, appliances, and buildings, low carbon fuel standard for refineries to reduce the 
content of carbon of motor vehicle fuels; and a cap and trade system (California EPA 2014). 
The AB-32 program began in 2013 with coverage of electricity sold in California and large-
scale manufacturing. In 2015, it was expanded to include fuels, covering 85% of the 
emissions in the state. The 2013 cap was set at about 98 percent of anticipated 2012 
emissions. Most allowances were initially distributed via free allocation and use of auctions 
over time. Through May 2015, the AB-32 cap and trade auctions had produced over $2 
billion. Granting free allowances to facilities in particular sectors in proportion to their 
production levels contributes to output and impact directly competitiveness. On the 
contrary, giving allowances for free to firms in certain areas does not affect the receiving 
company's competitiveness, because its marginal production costs are unaffected.                                            
 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)  
This system is by far the largest current cap and trade program in the world for CO2 
allowances. It was adopted in 2003 with a pilot phase that started in 2005 and covered half 
of EU CO2 emissions in more than 30 countries. There are over 11 thousand regulated 
emitters including electricity generators and large industrial sources. Competitiveness 
concerns were dealt with the allocation of free allowances to selected sectors. The program 
does not cover most sources in the transportation, commercial, or residential sectors, 
although some aviation sector emissions were included under the cap in 2012. The EU ETS 
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has been extended through its Phase III, 2013-2020, with a more stringent, centrally 
determined cap (20% below 1990 emissions), a larger share of allowances to be auctioned, 
tighter limits on the use of offsets, and unlimited banking of allowances between Phases II 
and III. One of the main lessons learned from the EU ETS experience is that granting free 
allowances to selected sectors is a poor way to deal with competitiveness concerns, though 
it may serve as a useful political function. When allocations are not associated with 
production, they do not affect marginal costs. Thus, incentives to increase output or to 
relocate production or investment in other jurisdictions remain unaffected. 
 
The EU ETS experienced serious problems in early 2013 when the market suffered 
a significant drop in prices (from $30 to about $8 per tonne). This decrease was the result 
of a massive overcapacity in the carbon market, caused partly by a general recession that 
reduced industrial demand for permits, and also because the EU handed out too many 
allowances at the beginning.  Political bargaining, prioritizing national interests over 
others’, and lobbyist loopholes have impacted negatively the success of the EU ETS system 





Chapter 3: Optimization Model 
This chapter presents the optimization problem that an oil and gas facility needs to 
solve while participating in a potential cap and trade system. 
As discussed before, the basic structure of a cap and trade system is very simple: 
total allowable emissions are limited (the cap), with an equivalent number of allowances 
created, and they may be sold on a market (the trade), the unused portion of the allowances 
can be traded to other companies struggling to comply or carried forward for future years.  
The cap and trade model, originally proposed by Dales in 1968, is a regulatory system 
focused on reducing pollution and to provide companies with a profit incentive to reduce 
their emission levels faster than their peers.  Since firms minimize total production costs 
and considering that the market for these permits is competitive, it can be shown that 
overall cost of achieving the environmental standard will be minimized. As any other 
regulatory system, facility emissions are required to be constantly monitored to check for 
compliance. 
Under a cap and trade system, operators are constrained to a total amount of 
emissions. They are allowed to acquire certified emission quotas on the market or invest in 
new technology to reduce emission levels to comply with the overall needs. The decision 
on purchasing permits or reducing emissions via investment in new technologies is a 
fundamental question, which can be modeled as a multi-stage optimization problem similar 
to Zhou, et al. 2015.  
The following optimization model will be implemented to evaluate the company’s 
decision of how much to invest in new and more efficient technologies to reduce emissions, 
and how many emission permits or certificates to buy in a likely cap and trade market for 




The non-linear (NLP) optimization model is based on minimizing the total cost of 
meeting the required emission over a specific period as follows: 
 
min Z ∑   
∑   ∑  




         
 




 = emission quotas to be purchased in cap and trade market by facility i in year t  
 = emission reduction by facility i with investment in technology j in year t 
Q = total emission reduction to be made for planning horizon 
 = unit cost for purchasing emission quotas on the cap and trade market at year t 
 = unit cost for reducing emission level via investment in technology j in year t 
δ = parameter representing non-linear cost function of emission reduction via technology 
implementation 
 = emission quotas available at the beginning of year t 
   = demand per period for net required emission for facility i in year t 
k = opportunity cost of investment 
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All methane emissions are reported in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(TCO2e). 
The first linear term in the objective function (1) represents the cost of buying 
emission certificates in the presence of a cap and trade market. The second non-linear term 
in equation (1) represents the cost of investing in new technology or abatement measures 
to reduce emissions. Therefore the solution of this model provides the minimum cost of 
achieving a total amount of emission reduction for the planned horizon.  
The first set of constraints in (2) is to ensure that the sum of emissions purchased 
in the cap and trade system, the amount of emissions reduced by technology improvements, 
and the carryover meets the required emissions for each year for each facility.  The second 
set is to represent unused emissions in one year that can be carried over to future years. 
The last constraint is to make sure that the total emissions reduction satisfies the goal set 
for the planning horizon.   
 
Marginal Pollution Abatement Cost Curve 
The non-linear term in the objective function represents the well-known concept of 
a marginal incremental cost curve, to model the cost of reducing emissions via technology 
improvement correctly. Abatement cost increases as accumulated emission reduction 
increases or in other words, the more reduced, the more difficult it is to reduce further. 
Figure 7 shows cost function. When total emission reduction is zero, which occurs at time 
t=1, the total cost C2 equals , for the following periods and as emission reduction 
increases, the cost of abatement also increases but at an exponential rate. Improvement 
cannot be indefinite because the abatement cost would also increase indefinitely. 
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The exponential terms within brackets in the second term of equation (1) represent 
the shaded area under the cost curve between points A and B. This is the total cost 
associated with abatement technology between two consecutive time periods. The value of 
parameter δ in the equation is the rate of change of the cost of specific abatement 
technology implementation.  






AREA OF INTEREST SELECTED: THE PERMIAN BASIN  
The Permian Basin is considered one of the most potentially productive shale plays 
in the USA. It has generated about 31.5 billion barrels of oil and 112 trillion cubic feet of 
gas since 1921. A recent report from the USGS (November 15th, 2016) indicated that the 
Wolfcamp shale in the Texas’ Permian Basin contains an estimated average of 20 billion 
barrels of oil, and 16 trillion cubic feet of associated natural gas. Current production is 
about 1.9 million barrels of oil (mmbo) and 6.6 billion cubic feet of gas (bcfg) per day 
(Berman, 2016). Scott Sheffield, Pioneer's CEO, said in July 2016, "The Permian is the 
mother lode. You factor in 4,000 feet of shales with 12 to 14 zones to play with...We'll be 
drilling that for the next 100, 150 years." The Permian Basin, located in West Texas and 
part of Southeastern New Mexico, covers about 250 miles wide and 300 miles long, and it 
includes about 43 counties in Texas and 5 in New Mexico. The basin is sub-divided into 




Figure 6. Permian Basin Map Location. 
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Geology of the Area 
The Permian Basin covers one of the thickest deposits of Permian-aged rocks in the 
world. The basin was named after the period of geologic time – the Permian, occurred 
between 300 million to 250 million years ago where the basin reached its maximum depth: 
29,000 feet. 
The evolution of the basin is attributed to three distinct phases 
1. Mass deposition 
2. Continental collision, and 
3. Basin filling.  
Before the Permian Basin was created, this area was a broad marine region called 
the Tobosa Basin. During the Cambrian-Mississippian periods, 541 to 323 million years 
ago, a significant amount of sediments was deposited in this area forming a depression. 
The basin began building by the end of Mississippian and beginning of Pennsylvanian, 323 
to 300 million years ago, when two supercontinents -- Laurasia and Gondwana -- collided 
to create Pangea. The area was covered by a seaway, and episodes of faulting, uplift, and 
erosion, as well as diverse rates of subsidence, caused structural deformations in the larger 
Tobosa Basin that divided it into sub-basins and platforms and finally created the filling of 
the sub-basins with sediments. The main sub-basins of the Permian are the Midland Basin 
and the Delaware basin, separated by the Central Basin Platform.  The other main sections 
include the Northwest Shelf, Marfa Bain, Ozona Arch, Hovey Channel, Val Verde Basin, 
and Eastern Shelf. (Wright, 2011). 
Deposition 
The Midland and Delaware sub-basins are of the same age and lithology, but depths 
and development vary throughout the area. These sub-basins subsided, and the platform 
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remained at a higher elevation. As a result, the area has very different water depths and 
depositional environments. The basins accumulated terrigenous clastics associated with 
deep water environments, whereas coarse grains associated with shallow reef environments 
were deposited along the platform (Sutton, 2015). Differences in sedimentary depositions 
and tectonics initiated stratigraphic discontinuities between the sub-basins.  
 
 




The Midland Basin 
The eastern Midland Basin accumulated large amounts of clastic sediments from 
the Ouachita orogenic belt during the Pennsylvanian occurred 323 to 299 million years 
ago. Sediments were deposited forming a deltaic system which drained the basin from east 
to west. During the Permian period, the delta system was covered with floodplains and 
nearly filled by the Middle Permian.  
The Delaware Basin 
The western area of the Permian Basin is the Delaware Basin, which is a structural 
and topographical low providing an inlet for marine water during most of the Permian. 
Secondary sedimentation was received from the low coastal plains surrounding the basin. 
While the Midland Basin was almost full of sediment by the Middle Permian, the Delaware 
became host to reefs built by microbial organisms, sponges, and algae. These organisms, 
along with the deep water inputs supplied by the Hovey Channel promoted carbonate 
buildups that formed a higher elevation area separating the shallow water and deep water 
deposits.  
Depth is important to understand sediment deposition in the basin. The Delaware 
Basin is about 2,000 feet deeper than the Midland Basin consequently causing the 
sediments to experience almost twice as much pressure during burial. This is a leading 
factor in the stratigraphic discontinuities between the two sub-basins. 
Drilling 
The Permian Basin has been drilled since the 1920s with peak of oil and gas 
production by the early 70s. Drilling activity in the basin had steadily risen until the end of 
2014. The Railroad Commission (RRC) of Texas reported more than doubling the permits 
issued for drilling from 2005 to 2012 and a notable increase in crude oil produced. Even 
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now with low rig counts, the Permian Basin has more working rigs than any other field in 
the U.S. The Permian Basin is the most prolific oil producing basin in the United States, 
and it has the largest number of wells drilled in the nation with about 400,000 wells to date 
(Berman, 2016).  
As Figure 8 shows, The US Energy Protection Agency tracks methane emissions 
for several Petroleum and Natural Gas System facilities through two programs: The GHG 
emissions and sinks (Inventory), and the GHG Reporting Program (GHGRP). 






The year 2014 is considered as the base case, for this year EPA reported methane 
emissions for a total of 56 facilities producing from the Permian Basin, and these data are 
the basis for forecasts of future emissions and allowances for the period 2016-2020. The 
list of these facilities is given in Appendix A. 
A total amount of 4.8 million of metric tons of CO2e were reported for these 56 
facilities in 2014 and involved about 112,000 wells. For reference, this level of emissions 
is equivalent to CO2 emissions for electricity use from 700,000 of homes in one year, five 
billion pounds of coal burned, or 500 million gallons of gasoline consumed (EPA GHG 
Equivalencies Calculator).  Appendix B presents a copy of the report of methane emissions 
for one particular facility obtained from the GHG EPA Tool (FLIGHT). 
About 54% of the total emissions reported in the Permian Basin in 2014 is 
associated with leaks from natural gas pneumatic devices, the major source of emissions 
for 32 facilities.   
 
 




Figure 9. Major Sources of CH4 emissions in the Permian Basin in 2014. 
The three main sources of emissions indicated above are the potential technology 
improvements or measures that facilities need to invest in to reduce emissions. Therefore, 
the decision variable  is the amount of emission reduction to be made by facility i 
with investment in technology to control emissions generated by (1) Venting and Flaring, 
(2) Pneumatic Devices, and (3) Atmospheric Tanks, for each of the five years projected.  
The top eight facilities were selected as the final sample to run the optimization 
model. They account for half of the emissions reported in 2014 (2.3 million TCO2e). These 
eight facilities are listed in Table 1, and they include about 22,000 wells producing since 





Table 2. Facilities selected for the model application. 
Figure 10. Leases selected for the sample. Red dots are gas wells, and green dots are oil 
wells. Map obtained from IHS-PowerTools Software. 
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ABATEMENT MEASURES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS 
As previously indicated, three major abatement measures are considered as 
technology improvements to reduce emissions, and they are briefly described. 
Pneumatic Devices 
Emissions from these devices are one of the largest sources of vented methane 
emissions from the oil and natural gas industry, and as indicated before, they represent the 
major source of emissions in the Permian Basin. Pneumatic devices bleed or release natural 
gas to the atmosphere. EPA’s new regulation requires reducing methane emissions by 
replacing high-bleed devices with low-bleed devices, retrofitting high-bleed devices, and 
improving maintenance practices. According to the Natural Gas STAR Program, high-
bleed pneumatics are any device that bleeds more than six standard cubic feet per hour 
(scfh) or over 50 million cubic feet per year. 
 The natural gas industry uses several devices to automatically operate valves, 
control pressure, temperature, flow, or liquid levels. These devices can be controlled by 
electricity or compressed air, when available and economical. In the vast majority of 
applications, however, the gas industry uses pneumatic devices that employ energy from 
pressurized natural gas. Methane emissions from pneumatic devices are estimated at more 
than 50 billion cubic feet (BCF) per year only in the production sector, 14 BCF per year in 
the transmission sector and less than 1 Bcf per year in the processing sector.  
Natural Gas STAR Partners have achieved significant savings and methane 
emission reductions through replacement, retrofit, and maintenance of high-bleed 
pneumatics. They have found that most retrofit investments pay for themselves in about a 
year and replacements in as little as six months. Up to date, Natural Gas STAR Partners 
have saved about 36 BCF by retrofitting or replacing high-bleed with low-bleed pneumatic 
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devices, representing a savings of $255 million worth of gas. Individual savings will vary 
depending on design, condition, and specific operating conditions of the controller.  
In the production sector, an estimate of about 400,000 pneumatic devices are being 
used and about 13,000 gas pneumatic devices in the processing sector. 
 In the transmission sector, about 85,000 pneumatic devices actuate isolation valves 
and regulate pressure and gas at compressor stations, pipelines, and storage facilities. Non-
bleed pneumatic devices are also found on meter runs at distribution company gate stations 
for regulating flow, pressure, and temperature.  
Field experience shows that nearly all high-bleed devices can be replaced with low-
bleed equipment or retrofitted.   
 
Gas Flaring and Venting 
Gas is flared or vented mostly because the lack of access to pipelines or gathering 
lines to transport gas to processing plants. Gas flares emit both methane and black carbon. 
Methane emissions from gas flares are the result of incomplete combustion of the waste 
gas and thus are related to the destruction efficiency of the flares. Mitigation options are 
related to increasing gas utilization by re-injecting associated gas, minimize local on-site 
gas utilization, and maximize recovery. 
Reducing the frequency of compressor startups avoids blowdowns and therefore 
reduces the volume of gas vented to the atmosphere with each startup. Poorly maintained 
ignition systems increase the incidence of failed engine starts and can stall the compressor 
once it is loaded. The compressor must then be unloaded and re-started. Each failed engine 
start wastes gas, produces unnecessary methane emissions, and reduces efficiency. 
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Remote production sites and compressor stations may vent low-pressure natural gas 
and vapors from storage tanks and other on-site equipment to the atmosphere, and 
emissions can be reduced by installing flares to combust these gasses instead of venting 
them directly to the atmosphere. Flaring technology typically consists of a small flare stack 
with one or two pilots and is normally installed on higher-pressure blowdown or emergency 
pressure relief valves for security reasons. Low-pressure gas installations are favored by 
environmental emissions control. For a single flare, methane emissions reductions of 2,000 
MCF per year can be achieved with a single pilot. EPA estimates that costs for a flare are 
about $3,000 and which vary significantly between $1,000 and $5,000 for different 
companies, fuel costs per year for each pilot is about $1,800.  
 
Emissions from Atmospheric Tanks 
These are emissions from flaring that are reported as source-specific “vented to 
flare” for “gas from produced oil sent to atmospheric tanks” for the GHGRP subpart W 
recorded by EPA.   
Table 3. Emissions reporting categories reproduced from EPA FLIGHT tool.  
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Chapter 4: Model Application 
As previously discussed, a firm participating in a cap and trade system must decide 
how much emission reductions to achieve with improvements in technology and by 
purchasing emission certificates in the market, therefore its strategy is represented as a cost 
minimization problem which can be solved by the non-linear optimization model described 
in the previous chapter. This chapter describes in more details the set of parameters 
considered to solve the problem and gives the results obtained for the period 2016-2020 
for the sample selected. 
 
PARAMETERS FOR THE MODEL 
Demand for emissions (di) 
This parameter is one of the most complex to estimate for the application of the 
model. It represents the demand of net required TCO2e methane emission for each of the 
eight facilities selected and for each of the next five years. The main assumption considered 
to estimate this parameter is that methane emissions are positively correlated with natural 
gas production. This hypothesis has been analyzed in various empirical studies and in 
general, they are consistent with the proposed positive correlation. Halley et al. (2014) 
investigated this relationship by using a multivariate linear regression, they found that 
emissions are positively correlated with gas production and about 10% of the variation in 
emission rates was caused by variation in production rates. In another study, scientists at 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), found a significant contribution of emissions 
from oil and gas production to methane levels since 2007, they stated that about 40% of 
the increase in methane emissions results from the increasing production of oil and natural 
37 
 
gas in the northern hemisphere (Hausmann, et al. 2016).  The positive relationship between 
gas production and methane emission was also confirmed for the sample selected by 
running simple linear regressions (with zero intercept, because the emission is null when 
no gas is produced). Regression coefficients (betas) for the eight facilities selected for the 
period 2011-2015 were obtained and are presented in Table 4. We can observe that methane 
emissions are positive and highly correlated to gas production for the sample, in the case 
of Parsley Energy, there was not enough emissions data available for previous years to 
compute this coefficient.  
Table 4. Regression coefficients between CH4 emissions and gas production for sample 
selected. 
Emission forecast for next five years was estimated by applying the linear 
regression coefficient (beta) to production forecast for each year. These coefficients are 
assumed to be constant through time.  In the case of Parsley Energy, the ratio between 
emissions and production for the year 2014 was used to forecast emissions for the 
following years. 
By using the principle discussed above, the estimation of di requires forecasting 
gas production for every single well included in each facility for the next five years, and 
then aggregating all of the wells that belong to the same facility to finally obtain the total 
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amount of emissions required by each facility per year. The final net emission requirement 
is computed by subtracting the total allowances given to each facility per year by a cap and 
trade system. As previous experiences of cap and trade systems (Schmalensee, et al. 2015) 
initial allowances could be an equal amount of emissions assigned to each facility, or 
allocations issued based on their historic levels. Allowances could be zero cost for facilities 
or auctioned. For the purpose of the model application, two cases of free allowances were 
considered:  
 
Case 1:  Equal amount of allowances based on emissions from major source 
reported in 2014, with a declining rate of 20% for following years after 2016. 
 
Case 2: Allowances are equal to 2014 levels from major source reported for each 
facility and declining at a rate of 20% for each of the following years. 
 
Each facility must decide the most efficient way to comply with its required amount 
of emissions for the planned time horizon by either reducing emission with abatement 
measures or more efficient technology and by purchasing additional emission certificates 
in the market. Facilities can carry forward unused allowances for future years. 
Forecast of gas production for each well is traditionally performed by using decline 
curve analysis of historical production with Arp’s equations. Published in 1945, Arps 
proposed a set of exponential and hyperbolic declining rate model to estimate future 





                                  1                                    (3) 
 
Where: 
q(t) = rate of volume/time at time t 
qi = stabilized rate of volume/time at time 0 
b = Arp’s decline constant 
D = decline rate at time 0, 1/time 
Decline curves can be one of three basic types depending on the value of b. 
- Exponential when b equals zero,  
- Hyperbolic when b is between zero and one, and  
- Harmonic when b is greater that one. 
For the application of this model, the software PowerTools v9.3 was used to 
compute the production forecast. The forecast is obtained by using what is called “expert 
fit” in the software which is based on Arp’s equations and an advanced algorithm to curve 
fit the data. This routine initially fits the most recent production data (last 12 months) and 
calculates the Goodness of Fit. Then a sequence of iterative trial fits is performed by 
entering an additional month of earlier historical data and recalculating the Goodness of 
Fit. PowerTools selects the fit that produces the best Goodness of Fit from among all of 
the trials.  
Once future gas production is estimated, regression coefficients indicated in Table 4 are 
applied to forecast emissions required (di) for the following five years (2016-2020). The 
following graph shows the production forecast obtained for one of the facilities selected in 





Figure 11. Forecast of production based on declining analysis. Facility: Diamondback 
Energy. Output modified from PowerTools v9.3. 
Cost of emission reduction by technology improvement 
The unit cost for reducing emission levels via investment in technology, C2, is 
associated with three practices to reduce emissions cost-effectively: Venting and Flaring, 
Pneumatic Devices, and Atmospheric Tanks. The cost value of reducing a metric ton of 
CO2e for each of these practices is obtained from previous studies. For example, Carbon 
Limits (2012) states that the cost of gas venting and flaring control to reduce emissions 
ranges from $3 to about $60 per TCO2e for more than 850 cases evaluated (Figure 12 
below). The cost of controlling/converting pneumatic devices from high bleed to low bleed 
rates average about $3 TCo2e under this study. Alternatively, Clean Air Task Force 
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reported in March 2013 that based on EPA Natural Gas STAR Program technologies and 
practices, the average cost for controlling emissions from pneumatic devices is between 
$39 and $42 per metric ton of CO2e, and an average of $34 for the case of oil tanks. 
Different cost levels are considered for this parameter in the sensitivity analysis to observe 
its impact on total optimum cost. 
 
 
Figure 12. Abatement costs for methane emission reduction measures. Modified from 
Carbon Limits (December 2012). 
Cost of emission certificates 
This parameter (C1) is trading price of emissions and is randomly generated by 
using a uniform distribution with values between $15 and $25 per TCO2e. These values 
are consistent with estimates of carbon dioxide prices forecasted for the year 2020 (Synapse 
Energy, March 2015). 
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Total of emission reduction (Q)  
In August 2015, EPA stated that the Government expects to reduce emissions by 
45% below 2012 levels by 2025. Following similar goals and for model application, Q is 
set to 50% of emission levels recorded in 2014 for the Permian Basin. This parameter could 
play an important role for optimality conditions, and it is also included in the sensitivity 
analysis.  
Cost of Interest (k) 
A rate of 5% is considered to represent the time cost of investment made on 
improvements for emission reduction, and it can be associated with a loan interest rate. 
 
 





The following section presents the main results obtained by the optimization model 
run using the Excel Solver with the GRG Nonlinear engine. The basic model consisted of 
a total of 128 decision variables and 97 constraints. The parameters used to solve the 
problem are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 6 and Table 7 present the forecast of gas production and total demand of 
emissions required for each facility per year. Emission allowances given to each facility 
have not been deducted yet. Therefore, based on projected gas production, the total amount 
of methane emissions required for the planning horizon is 9,219,626 TCO2e. This total 
minus the allowances awarded to each facility provide the net emissions required (di) 
which must be satisfied either by purchasing certificates in the market and by investing in 
one of the three abatement technologies considered.   




Table 7. Forecast of methane emissions from gas production for 2016-2020. 
Case 1: Equal emission quotas allocated for each facility 
Under this case, the government gives each facility the same number of permits to 
emit, or allowances, based on actual emissions produced from major sources in 2014. 
These are free allocations, but facilities could buy auctioned allowances in the future. For 
this case and because I am considering only the top eight producers, each facility receives, 
initially for the year 2015, a total of 1/8th of the total 1,735,265 TCO2e, i.e., 216,908 
TCO2e. Allowances for following years decline at a 20% rate from the previous year. Table 
8 presents net emissions required for each facility. 
Table 8. Net emissions required for each facility for case 1. 
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Table 9 and Table 10 summarize the main results obtained with the NLP 
optimization model, considering the case without the impact of capital cost, and with the 
inclusion of a 5% loan interest rate.     
Table 9. Values of decision variables for optimization model without cost of capital. 
The total optimum cost under this case scenario is about $140 million and 27% of 
this cost is associated with purchasing emission certificates in the market. The total amount 
of emission reduction achieved is precisely the goal set at 2,350,540 TCO2e, and facilities 




As we can observe in this case without financial costs, facilities invest the smallest 
amount in emission reduction measures during the year 2016 (  = 212,638), which is 
consistent with the fact that market prices in the cap and trade system are more attractive 
than investment in technologies for that particular year.  
In the case of facilities Diamondback and Parsley, their major source of emissions 
is associated with venting and flaring activities, which has the highest cost of emission 
reduction with self-improvement actions. For this reason, we observe that the optimal value 
of emission reductions with self-improvement for them is marginal (X2), and these two 
facilities satisfy most of the net emission requirements by purchasing certificates in the cap 
and trade system. It is important to note that, in the absence of a cap and trade system, these 
two companies would have to invest more to reduce emissions because they would not 
have any other choice. By testing different values for the abatement cost of venting and 
flaring, it was possible to compute that only when this technology has a cost lower than 
$40 per TCO2e these two facilities begin investing in self-improvement measures to reduce 
emissions.  
The opposite occurs with facilities COG, Endeavor, and Devon. They are 
generating emissions mostly from gas sent to atmospheric tanks, which involves the 
cheapest abatement measure ( = $35), and for this reason, we observe that these three 
facilities do not invest in the cap and trade market at all, and they satisfy all their emission 
requirements with self-improvement measures. 
Another fact is that facilities select to purchase a large part of the emissions permits 
from the cap and trade market during the first year (2016) when market prices are the lowest 




Table 10 shows similar results for the decision variable emissions certificates 
acquired in the cap and trade market (X1) when a cost of capital of 5% is included.  
Table 10 Values of decision variables for model with 5% cost of capital. 
When time cost of money (or interest rate) is included, it is reasonable to make 
larger investments (improvements) at earlier stages to avoid financial costs, in this case, all 
of the investment is made in 2016.  X2 for 2016 is about 2.4 million TCO2e (which is also 
the emissions reduction goal set for the planned horizon) when a 5% interest is considered, 
compared to only 212,000 TCO2e for the same year when zero interest cost is considered. 
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The total cost for the optimal solution when interest expenses are included is $144 million, 
and 26% of this cost is associated with purchasing emission certificates.  
Case 2: Emission quotas allocated based on historical levels 
In this case, the total amount of emissions reported from the major source in 2014, 
1,735,265 TCO2e, are distributed to each facility based on historical levels for the year 
2015, and allowances for following years decline at a 20% rate from the previous year. Net 
total emissions required is the same than the previous case but the distribution for each of 
them is different.  
Table 11. Net emissions required for each facility for case 2. 
We observe that in this case 2 and for Diamondback facility, the parameters di for 
2016 and 2017 are negative, which indicates that the allowances assigned to this firm in 
those two years (313,206 and 250,565 TCO2e) were higher than the expected emissions 
required (as shown in Table 7, i.e., 263,344 and 244,425 TCO2e respectively). Therefore 




Results of the optimal solution for this case are a little different than those for Case 
1, particularly for cap and trade purchasing. Facilities prefer to invest in cap and trade 
emission certificates at later periods, but for investment in self-improvement technologies, 
they realize the investment in the early stages, similar to the previous case, to avoid 
financial costs. Same as before, Diamondback and Parsley Energy satisfy all the emissions 
required by purchasing in the cap and trade market, whereas Devon and COG reduce 
emissions only by investing in abatement technologies.  
Table 12 Values of decision variables for Case 2 with cost of capital of 5%. 
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The optimal solution in this Case 2 is less efficient than the previous one, about 
$8.4 million more expensive for the same amount of emissions reduction. In any case, it is 
important to note that the equilibrium allocation of pollution permits, after trading in the 
market has occurred, is independent of the initial allocation, therefore the initial allocation 
of allowances is designed more oriented to maximize political support without 
compromising the system’s environmental performance or raising its cost (Montgomery, 
1972). 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
All of the sensitivity analysis was performed using the case 1 scenario for 
allowances and including the cost of capital of 5%. 
Sensitivity on Self-improvement Cost (C2) 
Numerical experiments are applied to each abatement measure independently and 
considering facilities which major emissions are associated with that particular technology. 
Abatement Measures for Controlling Emissions from Venting and Flaring 
Diamondback and Parsley are the two facilities generating emissions from venting 
and flaring as the major source. The abatement cost for reducing emissions in the base case 
is $50 per TCO2e, and it is the highest cost of the three technologies considered. Therefore, 
we observe that these two firms do not invest in self-improvement technologies for cost 
higher than $37.5 per TCO2e. For cost equal or lower than $37.5 only Parsley will begin 




Table 13. Sensitivity analysis for abatement cost of Venting and Flaring. 
It is important to note that the total cost is not very sensitive to changes in this 
parameter. The decrease of 50% in the value of abatement costs for venting and flaring 
only produces a decrease of 7% of the total optimum cost. 
Abatement Measures for Controlling Emissions from Pneumatic Devices 
Three facilities are emitting methane particles from pneumatic devices as their 
major source; they are Cimarex, EnverVest, and Yates (YPC). Total cost is more sensitive 
to decreases in abatement expenses for this particular technology than increases. We 
observe that when the cost decreases by 50%, the total optimum cost will decrease to about 
31%, but it will only increase about 19% for increases of 50% in costs. In the case of 
Cimarex facility, the change in abatement costs will impact the combination of emissions 
reduction achieved by purchasing permits in the cap and trade and by self-improvement 
measures, but this company only invests in both options during 2016. In the case of 
EnverVest, only when the abatement costs are lower than $20 per TCO2e, the company 
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will select reducing emissions exclusively with technology improvement. In the case of 
Yates, this facility will prefer only self-improvement measures for an abatement cost equals 
or less than $30 per TCO2e.  
Table 14. Sensitivity analysis for abatement cost of Pneumatic Devices. 
Abatement Measures for Controlling Emissions from Atmospheric Tanks 
For three facilities considered in the sample, COG, Endeavor and Devon, the major 
source of methane emissions is recorded as gas from produced oil sent to atmospheric tanks 
by EPA.  The initial optimum solution obtained for these facilities at $35 per TCO2e as 
abatement cost, shows that none of them selected to participate in the cap and trade market, 
and all the emissions reduction required was satisfied by self-improvement measures taken 
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in the year 2016. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate no change in the value of decision 
variables for lower abatement costs, which is verified in the sensitivity analysis presented 
in Table 14. Only the total optimum cost is impacted by including lower values for this 
parameter, for example, a decrease of 13% in total cost caused by a decrease of 50% in the 
abatement cost for atmospheric tanks. Nevertheless, when the value of the abatement cost 
increases significantly, for example over 50%, all these facilities decide to participate in 
the cap and trade system to satisfy part of their emissions requirement.  When the abatement 
cost increases in 86% (to over $65 TCO2e) none of these facilities has the incentive to 
invest in abatement measures to reduce emissions. 
Table 15. Sensitivity analysis for abatement cost of Atmospheric Tanks. 
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Sensitivity analysis of abatement costs provides relevant information to identify at 
what values companies are encouraged to start investing more in self-improvement 
technologies to reduce emissions, especially when market-based alternatives are not 
available.  
Sensitivity on Total Emissions Reduction Target (Q) 
The total emissions reduction set as the goal for the planned horizon could be very 
controversial and primarily a political decision, which if it is not set correctly might 
underestimate the total requirement needed to achieve efficiency. To evaluate the impact 
on the total cost of setting different goals (Q), I performed several numerical experiments 
by changing the price of emission credits in the cap and trade market for different targets 
and computing the total cost associated with each new optimal solution. This sensitivity 
analysis will let us know if there is a correct amount of Q* to be set as emission reduction 
for the period 2016-2020.  For the analysis of this part, I set the baseline case for the 
emission prices observed in the cap and trade market as P = C1, which is the same set of 
prices used in all the previous optimization cases. Then I ran the model and computed the 
minimum cost associated with different levels of prices such as 0.5P, 0.75P, P, 1.5P, and 
1.75P, and for different levels of target emission reductions Q. The main results are shown 
in the following Table 15 and Table 16.  




Table 17. Total minimum cost associated with different targets Q for different price 
levels. 
As shown in Figure 13, when the prices of emission permits in the market are high, 
for example 1.5P and 1.75P curves, there is an evident level of Q that minimizes the total 
cost, in this case the right amount of emissions to set as goal should be 1.5 million of 
TCO2e, otherwise setting the goal too low or too high will be inefficient. When prices in 
the market are low, the tradeoff between Q and total cost disappears.  
Figure 13. Total cost curves for different emission reduction targets Q. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
Market-based environmental policies involve a fundamental distributional 
question: “How should we divide up the ‘pie’ created by placing a price on emissions?” A 
cap and trade system regulates the tradeoff between distribution and efficiency. It offers 
the “best of both worlds.”  
A cap and trade option is seen as an economically preferable alternative to more 
costly command and control regulations because setting a cap, provides certainty that total 
emissions will remain below prespecified specific level, the upper limit can be tightened 
over time and cap and trade can operate at local, regional or national scales. 
The cost of achieving substantial emission reductions in the future will depend 
importantly on the availability and cost of low or zero-emitting technologies. A cap and 
trade system that considers limits extending into the future provides important price signals 
and therefore incentives for firms to invest in the development and deployment of such 
technologies, thereby reducing the future costs of achieving emission reductions. (Stavins, 
2008).  
Based on previous cap and trade experiences, some of the most relevant lessons 
learned are: 
Cap and Trade programs have been proven to be environmentally and economically 
more effective compared to traditional command and control approaches, and have led to 
substantial technological change and process innovations (Schmalensee and Stavins 2015).  
Regulators must promote more confidence and trust by adopting a full commitment 
to the program and guaranteeing consistency in the market and their policies. 
From theory and experience, it is clear that a robust market requires a cap that is 
significantly below Business as Usual (BAU) emissions. 
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The allocation of allowances is certainly a major political issue, because of the large 
distributional impacts that can be involved. Free allowance allocation has proven to be a 
better way to build political support, although it foregoes the opportunity to cut the 
program's overall social cost by auctioning allowances and using the proceeds to cut other 
distortionary taxes. Periodic evaluation is critical to keep programs on track. 
The success of any cap and trade system depends heavily on political liability and 
the existence of a proper administration. This system is vulnerable to manipulation by the 
political power of energy interest and environmental activist groups, and for this reason, 
the establishment of clear rules backed by ongoing government commitment are critical 
for its survival.   
The outcome of this research provides a distinctive and significant evidence to base 
public policy decisions related to emission reductions, and the model is a necessary tool to 
support analysis of various environmental compliance issues present in the oil and gas 
industry.  
 The rules for emissions regulation in the oil and gas industry will keep changing, 
and the concept of externalities will become even more critical. We are far from the 
knowledge needed to make good climate policy to achieve a strategy that balances 






Appendix A: All facilities reported with methane emissions by EPA 
















Appendix C: Declining curves for the top facilities producing in the 
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